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I. INTRODUCTION
In December 2007, through two decisions, the Supreme Court sought to
clean up the confusion that it created just shy of three years earlier when it
rendered the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory in United States v.
Booker and called for circuit courts to begin reviewing sentences for
"unreasonableness." '  In one of those December decisions, Gall v. United
States, the Court clarified what it meant by reasonableness review and
explained that such review had both a procedural and substantive component. 2
In the other decision, Kimbrough v. United States, the Court gave more
meaning to the substantive component, explaining that district courts were free
to disagree with policies set forth in the Sentencing Guidelines, such as the
disparate treatment of crack and powder cocaine offenses. 3 What the Supreme
Court neglected to do in these cases, however, was to reconcile the continued
requirement that district courts calculate and consider the Sentencing
Guidelines range in order to satisfy procedural reasonableness review with the
limited substantive reasonableness review fashioned by Gall and Kimbrough
combined. Now that sentencing judges have permission to consider systematic
problems with the Guidelines as a basis for imposing a sentence outside of the
Guidelines range,4 it has begun to look increasingly unnecessary to require that
district courts calculate the Guidelines range in order to impose a reasonable
sentence. Several scholars have criticized the Sentencing Guidelines, the
courts' reluctance to let go of them, and the confusion created by
reasonableness review. 5 This Article does not seek to re-argue those positions;
nor does the Article repeat claims that the Supreme Court's recent opinions do
1. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005).
2. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007).
3. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 574-75 (2007).
4. Id. at 575.
5. For criticisms of the Guidelines, see Daniel J. Freed & Marc Miller, Handcuffing the
Sentencing Judge: Are Offender Characteristics Becoming Irrelevant? Are Congressionally
Mandated Sentences Displacing Judicial Discretion?, 2 FED. SENT'G REP. 189, 189-91 (1990)
(arguing that losing judicial discretion leads to crudeness in sentencing rather than equity). See
also Maria Rodrigues McBride, Restoring Judicial Discretion, 5 FED. SENT'G REP. 219, 219
(1993) (explaining several problems with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, including increased
disparity in sentencing and lack of checks and balances); Gerald F. Uelmen, Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: A Cure Worse Than the Disease, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 899, 905 (1992) (arguing that
the Guidelines lead to results worse than the shortcomings of sentencing pre-Guidelines). For
discussions of the courts' reluctance to let go of the Guidelines and the confusion created by
reasonableness review, see Adam Lamparello, The Unreasonableness of "Reasonableness"
Review: Assessing Appellate Sentencing Jurisprudence After Booker, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 174,
174-78 (2006) (examining the discrepancies among circuits in applying the vague reasonableness
review standard). See also Douglas A. Berman, Claiborne and Rita-Booker Cleanup or
Continued Confusion?, 19 FED. SENT'G REP. 151, 152-53 (2007) (discussing the enduring
practical challenges following Booker).
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not solve the constitutional problem caused by mandatory guidelines. 6 Rather,
this Article examines the newly defined parameters of reasonableness review,
discusses the psychology of sentencing decision-making, and reveals the folly
of the continued requirement that district courts calculate the applicable
Guidelines range before determining a reasonable sentence.
Booker was concerned with balancing uniformity in sentencing with
renewed judicial discretion in choosing an appropriate individual sentence.7
Gall and Kimbrough built on both of these goals by maintaining the
Sentencing Guidelines as a source of sentencing uniformity, but also by
defining reasonableness review to clarify the scope of judicial discretion to
sentence outside of the Guidelines ranges. 8 However, the tension between
procedural reasonableness based on consideration of the Sentencing Guidelines
and substantive reasonableness that allows district judges to disregard the
Guidelines for policy errors suggests that the best path toward achieving the
balance between sentencing uniformity and sentencing discretion endorsed in
Booker is to rethink the role of the Sentencing Guidelines. Examining
sentencing and reasonableness review from a psychological aspect, rather than
a purely constitutional one, reveals that there are practical reasons for adjusting
the continued role of the Sentencing Guidelines, regardless of one's
constitutional philosophy.
Part II of the Article discusses the anchoring phenomenon (a psychological
aspect of decision-making), and links that concept to the current use of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. In doing so, Part II includes a historical
background of federal sentencing practice, and an explanation of the
implications of Guidelines miscalculations. Part III of the Article analyzes the
reasonableness review standard by discussing the possible and chosen methods
for defining reasonableness review as the Supreme Court moved from Booker
to Rita to Gall and Kimbrough, and the confusion that resulted. In Part IV, the
Article examines the federal judiciary's reluctance to let go of the current
usage of the Guidelines, and argues for considerable change in the Guidelines'
role in sentencing. Finally, suggestions for repurposing the Guidelines are
given in Part V of the Article.
IL. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DECISION-MAKING AND THE USE OF SENTENCING
GUIDELINES
In order to appreciate the psychological impact of the Sentencing Guidelines
and the case for revamping the function of the Guidelines, it is important to
6. For arguments about the continued constitutional problems post-Booker, see Berman,
supra note 5, at 151-52 (discussing the enduring constitutional challenges following Booker), and
Graham C. Mullen and J.P. Davis, Mandatory Guidelines: The Oxymoronic State of Sentencing
After United States v. Booker, 41 U. RICH. L. REv. 625, 626, 638, 641-42 (2007) (discussing the
unconstitutionality of the Guidelines resulting from "fact-based departures").
7. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005).
8. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 596-97 (2007); Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 574.
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understand how the Sentencing Guidelines came to be such a strong force in
federal sentencing. Judges got their first taste of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines in 1987, when the Guidelines were adopted pursuant to the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA). 9 Before the SRA, federal judges and
the U.S. Parole Commission served as the primary sentencing authority over
federal defendants.' 0  For many reasons, all three levels of government
expressed some degree of dissatisfaction with the wide discretion afforded to
judges in federal sentencing, which led to the ultimate passage of the SRA. 11
According to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, in imposing the
Sentencing Guidelines, Congress originally sought to achieve three goals: (1)
"honesty in sentencing"; (2) "uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide
disparity in sentences imposed by different federal courts for similar criminal
conduct by similar offenders"; and (3) "proportionality in sentencing through a
system that imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of
different severity."' 2 To attain these objectives, the SRA abolished federal
parole and directed the Sentencing Commission to create categories of offense
behavior and offender characteristics and to use the combination of such
categories to prescribe ranges of appropriate sentences for each class of
convicted persons. 13 Though it was not explicitly stated by the SRA that the
Sentencing Guidelines ranges had to be entirely mandatory, as time passed it
became evident that judges were to be bound by the Guidelines' sentencing
ranges.' 4  For twenty years, judges under this mandatory Guidelines regime
had the very limited discretion to sentence defendants anywhere within a
narrow sentencing range.'
5
9. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987.
10. For an explanation of the Parole Commission's powers before the adoption of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-18 (2000), repealed by Sentencing
Reform Act § 218(a)(5), 98 Stat. at 2027.
11. See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5
(1972) (noting his disagreement with the broad discretion given judges to determine sentencing
procedures); see also Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and
Other Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 679,
680-89 (listing many criticisms of the sentencing system that "culminated in the [SRA]"); Norval
Morris, Towards Principled Sentencing, 37 MD. L. REV. 267, 272-74 (1977) (examining studies
and concluding that "the data on unjust sentencing disparity have indeed become quite
overwhelming"); Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 228 (1993)
(describing Frankel's actions in criticizing the sentencing system).
12. U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § IAI .1 ed. n. (2007).
13. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 217(a),
235(b)(1), 98 Stat. 1987, 2020, 2032.
14. See Nancy Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence: American Judges and Sentencing,
4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 523, 524 (2007) (explaining how the Guidelines slid from advisory to
mandatory through judicial enforcement). In addition, the Supreme Court recognized the
Guidelines as mandatory in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 391 (1989), and Stinson v.
United States, 508 U.S. 36, 42 (1993).
15. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233-34 (2005).
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A. The (Not So) Big Change: United States v. Booker
Though the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines in their mandatory
form came under fire numerous times since the system's inception, it
eventually appeared well-settled that the Guidelines were constitutionally
sound. 6 However, in 1999, a line of cases began to unravel confidence in the
constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.1 7 Perhaps the heaviest
blow to the constitutionality of the then-mandatory Federal Sentencing
Guidelines came when the Supreme Court decided Blakely v. Washington in
2004 and, examining a Washington determinate sentencing scheme that shared
many similarities with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, clarified that a
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were threatened whenever a judge
imposes a sentence not "solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury
verdict or admitted by the defendant.' ' 8 In a dissent to the Blakely majority
opinion, Justice O'Connor recognized that the Court's decision made the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines vulnerable to attack.' 9 And then came Booker.
16. There are several cases in which the Supreme Court rejected constitutional challenges to
the Sentencing Guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997) (per
curiam) (holding that a sentencing court may consider the acquitted conduct of a defendant that
has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence); Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 406
(1995) (rejecting constitutionality concerns regarding sentence enhancements and double
jeopardy); United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 98 (1993) (concluding that the obstruction of
justice sentence enhancement did not undermine defendant's right to testify); Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (holding that the Guidelines were constitutional and amounted
to neither excessive delegation of legislative power nor violation of separation of powers
principle).
17. This line of cases began with Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999), in which the
Supreme Court held that provisions of the federal carjacking statute that imposed higher penalties
for serious bodily injury or death set forth additional elements of offense, not mere sentencing
considerations. Id. at 229, 251-52. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the Court
held that other than fact of prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for an offense
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. at 495-96. This reasoning was based on an understanding that the
"historical foundation" for the criminal law in this country recognizes a need to "guard against a
spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers" by requiring that "the truth of every
accusation... be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of [the defendant's] equals and
neighbours." Id. at 477 (internal quotation marks omitted). Two years later, the Supreme Court
advanced this line of thinking in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), by holding that a "trial
judge, sitting alone" is prohibited from determining the existence of the aggravating or mitigating
factors required for the imposition of the death penalty under Arizona law. Id. at 588. In Ring,
the Court specifically dispelled any argument that sentencing factors should be treated differently
than elements of a crime when it comes to whether a judge or jury has the authority to decide
certain facts that increase a defendant's authorized punishment (the highest sentence based on the
facts admitted to or found by the jury). Id. at 609.
18. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04 (2004).
19. Id. at 323-26 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The consequences of today's decision will be
as far reaching as they are disturbing. Washington's sentencing system is by no means unique.
Numerous other States have enacted guidelines systems, as has the Federal Government.").
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In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court finally addressed whether the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, in their mandatory form, violated the Sixth
Amendment. The Court held that its articulation of the rights provided by the
Sixth Amendment, as explained in Blakely, did indeed apply to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. 21 The Court explained that it is well-settled that "the
Constitution protects every criminal defendant 'against conviction except upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged.' 22  However, applying this principle to the
Sentencing Guidelines, the Court determined that "when a trial judge exercises
his discretion to select a specific sentence within a defined range, the defendant
has no right to a jury determination of the facts that the judge deems
relevant." 23 As such, the Supreme Court concluded that there would be no
constitutional problem with the Sentencing Guidelines if they were not binding
on judges. 24 However, because the Guidelines had "the force and effect of
laws," the Court determined that, in their mandatory form, the Sentencing
Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment by allowing for the imposition of an
enhanced sentence based on a sentencing judge's determination of a fact (other
than a prior conviction) that was not found by the jury or admitted to by the
defendant.25  At this point in the Court's opinion, it seemed as though the
Guidelines really were going to be put away for good. But, at least for some
Justices, the pull of the Guidelines was just too strong.26
Despite its conclusion that mandatory Guidelines violated the Sixth
Amendment, in order to avoid invalidating the entirety of the Guidelines, the
Supreme Court imposed the severability doctrine and instead invalidated only
the two provisions of the Guidelines that the Court determined had the effect of
making the Guidelines mandatory. 27  The Court turned to severability by
looking to congressional intent and determining that Congress would prefer
advisory Guidelines to any other possible fix to the constitutional problem of
mandatory Guidelines.28 The Court held that sentencing courts are required to
20. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
21. Id. at 226-27, 232-33.
22. Id. at 230 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).
23. Id. at 233.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 233-35.
26. Justice Stevens delivered the portion of the opinion of the Court that revealed the
constitutional problem with mandatory Guidelines, in which Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and
Ginsburg joined. Id. at 226, 244. Justice Breyer delivered the remedy portion of the opinion of
the Court, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg
joined. Id. at 244-45. Justice Stevens dissented in part, in which Justice Souter joined, and in
which Justice Scalia partially joined. Id. at 272. Justices Scalia and Thomas filed opinions
dissenting in part. Id. at 303, 313. And Justice Breyer filed an opinion dissenting in part, in
which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined. Id. at 326.
27. Id at 259-60.
28. Id. at 246-49.
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consider Guidelines ranges, but are permitted to tailor the sentence imposed in
light of the statutory sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).2 9
With this purported resolution of the constitutional problem posed by the
Guidelines, the Supreme Court attempted to preserve uniformity in sentencing
(by requiring judges to consider the Guidelines and statutory sentencing
factors) while also returning to sentencing judges the discretion to sentence
defendants outside of the Guidelines range with greater freedom.
30
The Booker remedy was reached by excising 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), the
provision making it mandatory for sentencing courts to impose a sentence
within the applicable Guidelines range absent circumstances justifying a
departure, and § 3742(e), the provision setting forth the standards for appellate
review.31  The Court struck § 3742(e), not because it disagreed with the
standard of review set forth by the Guidelines, but because § 3742(e) contained
cross-references to the excised § 3553(b)(1). 3 2 This left the Court with the
need to read an implied standard of review into the Guidelines. 33 Looking to
"the past two decades of appellate practice in cases involving departures," the
Court determined that the implicit standard of review for sentences was a
29. Id at 259-60. Pursuant to § 3553(a), sentencing courts shall consider:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of
the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence... to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for the law, and to providejust punishment ...
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence[s] and the sentencing range established for . . . the
offense... ;
(5) any pertinent policy statement ... issued by the Sentencing Commission... ;
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities... ; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to... victims ....
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (emphasis added).
30. That the balance between uniformity and discretion is important to the Court was
reiterated by Justice Breyer in the Gall oral argument. Justice Breyer asked:
I want to know your view of it, too, because what I want to figure out here by the end
of today is what are the words that should be written in your opinion by this Court that
will lead to considerable discretion on part of the district judge but not totally, not to
the point where the uniformity goal is easily destroyed.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007) (No. 06-7949).
31. Booker, 534 U.S. at 245. Section 3742(e) instructed circuit courts to review sentences
to determine whether they were (1) in violation of law; (2) resulting from an incorrect application
of the Guidelines; (3) outside of the applicable Guidelines range; and (4) whether the district
court failed to provide a written statement of reasons, or the sentence departed from the
Guidelines range based on an improper factor or in contradiction to the facts. 18 U.S.C. §
3742(e).
32. Booker, 543 U.S. at 260.
33. Idat260-61.
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"review for 'unreasonable[ness].' ' 34 According to the Court, this standard was
"not foreign to sentencing law" and it was therefore "fair ... to assume judicial
familiarity with a 'reasonableness' standard. 35 As such, the Supreme Court
effectively left it to the circuit courts to infuse meaning into reasonableness
review of federal sentences. During the next couple of years, district and
circuit courts struggled with understanding what an advisory Guidelines
regime meant and what was required for a reasonable sentence.36 As the courts
dealt with this "new" system, several scholars and practitioners criticized the
courts' strict treatment of sentences that fell outside of the Guidelines ranges,
as compared to the more lenient treatment of within-Guidelines sentences,
arguing that the Guidelines were being given an unconstitutional quasi-
mandatory status.3 7  However, though the effect of the Guidelines on
sentencing has constitutional implications, it has practical, decision-making
implications as well. It is these psychological concerns that can speak to those
of any constitutional philosophy about the error of continuing the usual
practice of requiring calculation of the Guidelines range before reasonable
sentences can be imposed.
B. Psychology, Decision-Making, and Guidelines Miscalculations
A multitude of research studies indicate that people use shortcuts to make
cognitive activity, such as complex decision-making, easier. 38 It is widely
accepted among psychologists that people make numerical judgments by
adjusting from a base anchor.39 In other words, when people make numerical
34. Id. at 261 (alteration in original).
35. Id. at 262-63.
36. See Lamparello, supra note 5, at 174.
37. See, e.g., Sixth Amendment-Federal Sentencing Guidelines-Presumption of
Reasonableness: Rita v. United States, 121 HARv. L. REV. 245, 245 (2007) (arguing that by
approving a presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences, the Supreme Court
"implicitly sanctioned lower court treatment of the Guidelines as de facto mandatory after
Booker.").
38. See R. Barry Ruback & Jonathan Wroblewski, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Psychological and Policy Reasons for Simplification, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 739, 753-54
(2001) (explaining that individuals "are likely to use shortcuts and other heuristics and to base
their decisions on relatively limited information" (footnote omitted)).
39. In the 1970s, cognitive psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman conducted a
series of experiments on judgments and decision-making and found that people rely on a number
of heuristic principles, including anchoring, to reduce complex decisional tasks. Amos Tversky
& Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 ScI. 1124, 1128-
30 (1974). Additionally, "scaling" is a phenomenon that is related to anchoring. In a 1986 study,
Norbert Schwarz and others concluded that when given a range from which to make a decision,
people use that range as a frame of reference that affects their ultimate decision. Norbert Schwarz
et al., Response Scales: Effects of Category Range on Reported Behavior and Comparative
Judgments, 49 PUB. OPINION Q. 388, 388-95 (1985). Though I refer to anchoring in this Article,
scaling is also similarly relevant. However, the main point of the psychological discussion is that
the Guidelines ranges act as anchors that pull judicial sentencing decisions toward that range.
[Vol. 58:115
2008] The Need for Change in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 123
decisions, they often rely on an initial value available to them and their
ultimate decision is "anchored" to that initial value.40 A 2001 study conducted
by Birte Englich and Thomas Mussweiler indicated that judges are also
susceptible to anchoring, and that their sentencing decisions are greatly
influenced by suggested sentences. 4' While anchoring can be a helpful
cognitive shortcut, it is also considered a judgmental bias that can greatly
distort decision-making. 42 This is because even irrelevant anchors have an
effect on decisions.43 In their article Inside the Judicial Mind, Professors Chris
Guthrie and Jeffrey Rachlinski and Judge Andrew Wistrich recognize that
sentencing guidelines can act as unbiased anchors that can improve judicial
decision-making by reducing a judge's reliance on irrelevant or biased anchors
from prosecutors or defense attorneys. 44  However, this assumes that the
sentencing guidelines themselves are not biased or flawed. Consequently, a
court's reliance on the Guidelines as an anchor becomes problematic when that
anchor is biased in some fashion. Examining the anchoring nature of
Guidelines miscalculations by discussing an actual federal sentencing appeal
best demonstrates the problem of biased anchors.
In United States v. Medina-Argueta, a Fifth Circuit post-Booker appeal,
defendant Medina-Argueta pleaded guilty to harboring and conspiring to
harbor illegal aliens, but preserved the right to appeal the district court's
increase of his sentence by two levels pursuant to the "vulnerable victim"
enhancement under § 3A1.1(b)(1) of the Guidelines. 45 Ultimately, the district
judge determined that the applicable Guidelines range was thirty-seven to
forty-six months imprisonment, and sentenced the defendant to consecutive
46thirty-seven-month prison terms on all charges. However, on appeal the Fifth
Circuit found that the district court improperly included in the vulnerable
victim enhancement to the Guidelines range calculation.4 7 Therefore, the Fifth
Circuit determined that the correct Guidelines range was actually thirty to
40. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 787-88 (2001).
41. Birte Englich & Thomas Mussweiler, Sentencing Under Uncertainty: Anchoring Effects
in the Courtroom, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1535, 1538-41 (2001).
42. See id at 1536; see also J.J. Prescott & Sonja Starr, Improving Criminal Jury Decision
Making After the Blakely Revolution, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 301, 325-26 (describing anchoring's
distortive effects on juries).
43. Guthrie, Rachlinksi & Wistrich, supra note 40, at 788 ("Even though the initial values
were clearly irrelevant to the correct answer, the initial values had a pronounced impact on the
participants' responses.").
44. Id. at 793-94.
45. United States v. Medina-Argueta, 454 F.3d 479, 480-81 (5th Cir. 2006).
46. Id at 481.
47. Id. at 482-83. According to the circuit court, the vulnerable victim enhancement only
applied to victims who are "vulnerable members of society and fall in the same category as the
elderly, the young, or the sick." Id. at 482. Therefore, the mere status of being an illegal alien, as
was the case with Medina-Argueta's victims, is not enough to find the unusual vulnerability
necessary to warrant the vulnerable victim enhancement. Id.
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thirty-seven months imprisonment.48  Though the sentencing court had
incorrectly calculated the Guidelines range, the thirty-seven-month sentence it
imposed still fell within the correct thirty to thirty-seven month Guidelines
range.49 Therefore, the Court held that "in situations such as this, in which the
district court miscalculates the guideline range yet imposes a sentence that falls
within a properly calculated guideline range, the sentence enjoys a
presumption of reasonableness."5 0 The Fifth Circuit did not discuss that the
sentence imposed was the lowest possible sentence in the district court's
miscalculated Guidelines range. It was not mentioned by the circuit court that,
once the correct Guidelines range was determined, the sentence imposed by the
district judge was actually the highest possible sentence within that proper
Guidelines range. Instead, the Fifth Circuit ignored that reality and found that
applying the presumption of reasonableness in the face of this miscalculation
was warranted because remanding would just result in the same sentence. In a
footnote, the court explained:
Furthermore, the district court stated that, in its view, any lower
sentence would be inappropriate. . . . Medina-Argueta's sentence
was not imposed "as a result of an incorrect application of' [the
miscalculation], which would require reversal under the still-intact
18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1). Formalism does not require us to vacate
Medina-Argueta's sentence so that the district court, on remand, will
simply impose the exact same sentence, which on subsequent appeal
we would be required to presume reasonable.... 5 1
The approach taken by the Fifth Circuit ignores the psychological realities of
sentencing. Researchers have explained that "[t]o the extent that judges use
different judgmental anchors to make their sentencing decisions, the resulting
sentences are likely to differ., 52 Therefore, it cannot be assumed that when the
Guidelines range considered by the sentencing judge shifts, however slightly,
that such a change would not make a difference in the ultimate sentence.
53
Even the district judge's own statement that any lower sentence was
inappropriate is not grounds to presume the sentence reasonable.5 4 This is
because one suggested reason for why anchoring occurs is the social
implications theory.55  According to this theory, anchors influence people
because they believe that the anchors convey meaningful information, even if
48. Id at 483.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 484 n.2 (citation omitted).
52. Englich & Mussweiler, supra note 41, at 1537.
53. Id. at 1540-41.
54. See Dan Orr & Chris Guthrie, Anchoring, Information, Expertise, and Negotiation: New
Insights From Meta-Analysis, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 597, 607-08 (2006).
55. Seeid. at 601-02.
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56the anchors do not. In Rita v. United States, the case that ultimately upheld
the use of the presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences,
the Supreme Court endorses this view of the Sentencing Guidelines'
importance when it goes to great lengths to express the role of the Sentencing
Commission in determining sentencing factors and appropriate sentencing
ranges.57 This position is repeated in Gall, where the Court describes the
Sentencing Guidelines as "the product of careful study based on extensive
empirical evidence derived from the review of thousands of individual
sentencing decisions."
58
In fact, the history of judicial application of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines indicates that judges also have felt that the Guidelines contain
relevant and trustworthy sentencing determinations. Judge Nancy Gertner has
made this observation several times in her writings on federal sentencing. In
her article From Omnipotence to Impotence: American Judges and Sentencing
Judge Gertner stated that, "In fact, in the new advisory regime, judge after
judge announced that the Commission had considered all the purposes of
sentencing; the Guidelines perfectly embodied them. All the judge had to do-
the expert clerk again-was to apply them., 59 It is undoubtedly true that, in
Booker, the Supreme Court intended for the Guidelines to act as an anchor in
judicial sentencing decisions. The Supreme Court maintained the Guidelines
in an advisory role to act as just that-an anchor to promote uniformity in
judicial sentencing decisions across districts. 60 Fundamentally, there is nothing
faulty about relying on guidelines as anchors in order to facilitate uniformity.
The problem, though, arises when those guidelines are faulty. Because of the
anchoring effect, the requirement to consider the Sentencing Guidelines will
affect the sentencing judge's ultimate determination. However, once that
anchor is tainted by the inclusion of an improper sentencing consideration,
leading to a miscalculation, then the Guidelines become a faulty anchor that
nonetheless influences the ultimate sentence imposed. Because the judge in
Medina-Argueta considered a faulty anchor in determining that nothing but a
thirty-seven-month sentence would be appropriate, his decision is not reliable
as one made independently of his Guidelines miscalculation.
Once the Guidelines range is calculated, that range automatically influences
the sentencer. And, when that range has been determined erroneously, the
resulting sentence is automatically affected. The Supreme Court has partially
addressed this reality by crafting a procedural aspect to reasonableness review,
under which a miscalculation renders a sentence procedurally unreasonable.
62
56. Id. at 602.
57. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2463-65 (2007).
58. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594 (2007).
59. Gertner, supra note 14, at 536.
60. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 596.
61. United States v. Medina-Argueta, 454 F.3d 479, 483 (5th Cir. 2006).
62. Gall. 128 S. Ct. at 597.
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However, the Court neglected to discuss the effect of the Guidelines on a
sentencing decision when it broadened the scope of substantive reasonableness
review by giving district courts the discretion to disregard the applicable
Guidelines range when that range is tainted by bad sentencing policy. This
point is best understood through a more thorough discussion of reasonableness
review.
III. UNDERSTANDING REASONABLENESS REVIEW: THE MOVE FROM BOOKER
TO RITA TO GALL AND KIMBROUGH
The Supreme Court seemed to recognize the Sentencing Guidelines as an
anchor designed to promote sentencing uniformity when, in Gall, it explained
that "[a]s a matter of administration and to secure a nationwide consistency,
the Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark. 6 3 In
clarifying reasonableness review in Gall, the Supreme Court decided to keep
the Guidelines in its place of prominence, telling circuit courts that district
courts must first bow to the Guidelines before making any sentencing
decision.64 However, on the very same day, in Kimbrough, the Court gave
district courts permission to knock the Guidelines off of its pedestal in certain
situations. 65 In other words, the Supreme Court maintained the importance of
the Sentencing Guidelines despite its demotion to advisory status by Booker, at
the same time increasing the district courts' power to disregard those all-
important Guidelines in the case of systematic errors that go beyond the
situation of the particular individual before the court. The mixed message sent
in the Court's clarification of the reasonableness review standard is what
makes the Court's adherence to the Guidelines' calculation requirement look
increasingly misplaced. The dilemma caused by continuing to require
calculation of the Guidelines becomes clearer through a discussion of how
reasonableness review took shape in the years following Booker.
A. The Many Possible Forms of Reasonableness
Once the Supreme Court decided in Booker that mandatory sentencing
guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment, there were many remedies that the
Court could have chosen from to cope with the consequences of its
constitutional decision. One option would have been to invalidate the
Guidelines entirely.66 Another possibility for the Court would have been to
63. Id. at 596.
64. See id
65. See Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 564 (2007).
66. In finding that certain portions of the Guidelines could be excised to correct the
constitutional problem, the Court determined that the Guidelines were not inapplicable as a
whole. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005). In the remedy opinion, the Court
stated, "We must decide whether or to what extent, 'as a matter of severability analysis,' the
Guidelines 'as a whole' are 'inapplicable . .. such that the sentencing court must exercise its
discretion to sentence the defendant within the maximum and minimum set by statute for the
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require jury determinations of all facts that would influence a defendant's
sentence. Instead, though, the Supreme Court decided to resuscitate the
Guidelines and leave them in an advisory form for district courts to consider.
68
Then, rather than leaving the current standard of review intact, the Court read
reasonableness review into the remaining portions of the Guidelines.
69
Even once it had adopted reasonableness review, the Supreme Court had
many options for giving that standard clear meaning, rather than leaving it in
the hands of circuit courts that had become quite comfortable with their role in
the mandatory Guidelines regime. The Supreme Court could have decided
whether reasonableness review would have both a procedural and substantive
element; whether it would be an objective or subjective standard; and how
substance and procedure would intersect with objectivity or subjectivity. The
following table may provide a helpful way of looking at these choices.
offense of conviction."' Id. at 245 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at (1), Booker, 543 U.S.
220 (No. 04-104)).
67. See id. at 246. The Court cited to several reasons for concluding that "the constitutional
jury trial requirement is not compatible with the [Sentencing] Act as written and that some
severance and excision are necessary." Id. at 248. One of those reasons included the statute's
language that "'[t]he court' . .. consider 'the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant."' Id. at 249 (first alteration in original) (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. V 2005)). Another reason was Congress's desire to base
punishment on real conduct that the Court argued is best determined by a judge. Id. at 250. The
Court also determined that a jury trial requirement would make the sentencing system more
complex than Congress intended. Id. at 254-55. Additionally, the Court concluded that plea
bargaining in a jury requirement system would increase disparity in sentencing. Id. at 255-57.
Lastly, the Court determined that "Congress would not have enacted sentencing statutes that
make it more difficult to adjust sentences upward than to adjust them downward," as the Court
expects would result if the jury requirement were imposed. Id. at 257.
68. Id. at 246.
69 Id at 260-61
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OBJECTIVE SUBJECTIVE
(CIRCUIT COURT'S (DISTRICT COURT'S
POINT OF VIEW) POINT OF VIEW)
PROCEDURAL Deference to imposed Deference to imposed
REASONABLENESS sentence so long as there sentence so long as the
are no miscalculations district court has calculated
and reviewing court can the Guidelines (even if
find § 3553(a) factors to there are errors in the
support the sentence. calculation) and has stated
any § 3553(a) factors in
support of the sentence.
SUBSTANTIVE Deference to imposed Deference to imposed
REASONABLENESS sentence so long as sentence so long as district
reviewing court can court has given reasons for
identify legitimate sentence that are not
reasons to support contrary to law or facts.
sentence.
As this table displays, one question emerging from Booker was whose
concept of reasonableness was to rule. Would circuit courts give deference to
district courts that gave reasons to support the reasonableness of their
sentencing determinations? Or was it the job of circuit courts to create their
own common law of reasonableness requirements that they would apply to
cases on review? However, deciding whether reasonableness review was to be
a subjective or objective standard was not all that was left to be answered by
the Supreme Court after Booker. There was also the issue of whether
reasonableness review considered a district court's procedural steps only, or
70whether there would be a substantive component to reasonableness review.
None of these issues were answered by Booker, and so the circuit courts were
left with the task of sorting through these questions. Confusion resulted.
B. Reasonable Confusion
One development that emerged from the circuit courts' confusion about
what reasonableness review meant was the presumption of reasonableness for
sentences that fell within the applicable Guidelines range. The presumption of
reasonableness allowed circuit courts to continue treating within-Guidelines
sentences in the same way as before Booker was decided, by essentially
stamping reasonableness on those sentences. The Eighth Circuit was one of
70. The Court's continued indecision about whether reasonableness review would have a
procedural and/or substantive component was evident in the oral arguments in Gall. At one point,
Chief Justice Roberts asked, "Well then, what's left of the appellate review? I mean, under your
theory is there any substantive review for the appellate court or is it all just procedural .... "
Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007) (No. 06-7949).
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the first to adopt the presumption in July 2005.71  It did so with little
explanation and fanfare, simply stating, "[The defendant's] sentence, however,
was within the guidelines range for his offense level ... and as a result, we
think that it is presumptively reasonable." 72 Just days later, the Seventh Circuit
also imposed a presumption of reasonableness to a within-Guideline sentence.
In United States v. Mykytiuk, the Seventh Circuit explained:
But while a per se or conclusively presumed reasonableness test
would undo the Supreme Court's merits analysis in Booker, a clean
slate that ignores the proper Guidelines range would be inconsistent
with the remedial opinion. As Booker held, "the district courts,
while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult those
Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing." The
Guidelines remain an essential tool in creating a fair and uniform
sentencing regime across the country.
73
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the Seventh Circuit in February 2006 and also
adopted the presumption of reasonableness, 4 just as the Sixth Circuit did the
month before.7 5 Likewise, when the Tenth Circuit adopted the presumption in
February 2006, it also cited the Guidelines' purpose of fostering uniformity in
sentencing as support for its decision.
76
The Fifth Circuit provides, perhaps, one of the most explicit demonstrations
of how the presumption of reasonableness developed. In reasoning that a
sentence within the Guideline range needed "little explanation," the Fifth
Circuit stated, in United States v. Mares, "If the sentencing judge exercises her
discretion to impose a sentence within a properly calculated Guideline range,
in our reasonableness review we will infer that the judge has considered all the
factors for a fair sentence set forth in the Guidelines."'7 In a handful of cases
in the year following Mares, the Fifth Circuit further developed its
reasonableness review standard by adopting a full-blown rebuttable
presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences. Drawing on a
district court's Booker duty to "consider" the Sentencing Guidelines, the Fifth
Circuit, in the 2005 decision United States v. Alonzo, followed the leads of the
Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits and agreed that "a sentence within a
,,78properly calculated Guideline range is presumptively reasonable.. The court
explained that this presumption did not mean that such sentences are per se
71. See United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005).
72. Id. at717.
73. United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 607-08 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted)
(quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at 264).
74. See United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006).
75. See United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2006).
76. See United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
77. United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005).
78. United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006).
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reasonable. 79 Rather, the court reasoned that its indication in Mares that it
would give great deference to sentences within the Guidelines range was
practically the same as a presumption of reasonableness for such sentences
whereby a defendant maintains the burden of demonstrating that the sentence
is unreasonable.
80
According to the circuits that have adopted a presumption of reasonableness
for within-Guideline sentences, the presumption is based on the Supreme
Court's directive to district courts that they "consider" the Sentencing
Guidelines. 81 In so holding, these circuits note that the purported objective is
to preserve the uniformity in sentencing facilitated by the Sentencing
Guidelines by requiring that sentencing judges use the properly calculated
Guidelines range as a beginning frame of reference. At the same time, these
circuits adopting the presumption of reasonableness claim that such a
presumption does not cut against the judicial discretion allowed by Booker,
because it does not require district judges to sentence within the Guidelines
range. Instead, the presumption of reasonableness merely allows reviewing
courts to presume that sentencing judges have considered the relevant
sentencing factors when they choose a sentence that falls within the Guidelines
range. Though this presumption can, theoretically, be rebutted by a defendant
by showing that the sentence is somehow unreasonable in his particular case, it
has acted as a rubber stamp, affording within-Guidelines sentences their pre-
Booker treatment. 82  The effect of the presumption of reasonableness for
within-Guidelines sentences suggests that the possibility of rebutting the
presumption is nearly non-existent. The New York Council of Defense
Lawyers (NYCDL) has gathered data showing that, out of 1152 appeals of
within-Guidelines sentences post-Booker, only sixteen sentences have been
vacated.83 Out of those sixteen, only one was vacated because the within-
Guidelines sentence was determined to be substantively unreasonable. 84 The
others were vacated for procedural reasons owing to the district court's failure
to adequately articulate reasons for the sentence.85 The one case of a within-
Guidelines sentence found to be substantively unreasonable, United States v.
Lazenby, was a highly unusual case in which two defendants treated in the
same appeal were given vastly different sentences. 86 The NYCDL research
shows that parties are overwhelmingly losing appeals of sentences that fall
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
82. See Lamparello, supra note 5, at 175-76.
83. Brief for the New York Council of Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 3, Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007) (No. 06-5754).
84. Id. app. at 3a.
85. Id.
86. United States v. Lazenby, 439 F.3d 928, 929 (8th Cir. 2006).
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within the Guidelines range when a presumption of reasonableness is applied.87
These results imply that the presumption of reasonableness may not be acting
as much like a truly rebuttable presumption as the Supreme Court and circuits
employing the presumption have suggested. Rather, it appears that in practice
the presumption of reasonableness acts as a tool that allows courts to live in a
pre-Booker mandatory Guidelines world. What is clear from the development
of the presumption of reasonableness, though, is that courts feel comfortable
enough giving credibility to the ranges provided in the Sentencing Guidelines
that sentences falling within Guidelines ranges are viewed as being more
reliably reasonable than other sentences.
C. The Rita Decision
The Supreme Court apparently agreed with the line of thinking adopted by
presumption circuits when, in Rita v. United States, it held that, on appeal, a
rebuttable presumption of reasonableness can be applied to a sentence within a
properly calculated Guidelines range.8 8 Rita was an appeal from a Fourth
Circuit case involving an illegal machine gun assembly kit in which Victor
Rita was charged with perjury, making false statements, and obstructing
justice. 89 Because Rita's sentence of thirty-three months imprisonment fell
within the applicable thirty-three to forty-one month Guidelines range, all it
took was a per curiam opinion for the Fourth Circuit to affirm the sentence as
presumptively reasonable. 90 Ultimately, in Rita, the Supreme Court affirmed
the Fourth Circuit decision.9' In upholding the presumption of reasonableness
for within-Guidelines sentences, the Supreme Court made several observations
about that presumption. First, the Court noted that "the presumption is not
binding." 92  According to the Court, this rebuttable presumption of
reasonableness imposes neither a greater burden of persuasion nor proof on
either the prosecution or the defense. 93 The Court's second observation was
that the presumption of reasonableness is an appellate presumption only,
meaning that a district court cannot simply sentence a defendant within the
Guidelines range because it presumes that range to be reasonable. 94 Perhaps
the third observation is the most important in explaining why the Court
87. See Brief for New York Council of Defense Lawyers, supra note 83, app. at 3a. The
NYCDL study did not follow a perfectly scientific model. In its brief, the NYCDL explains that
its "numbers do not capture those within-guidelines sentences that were not appealed, or the
significant number of appeals that continue to challenge only the guidelines calculation." Id. at 7,
n.7.
88. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007).
89. Id. at 2460.
90. See United States v. Rita, 177 F. App'x 357 (4th Cir. 2006).
91. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2470.
92. Id. at 2463.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2465.
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ultimately upheld the presumption. According to the Supreme Court, the
presumption is based on the belief that, by the time a within-Guidelines
sentence comes before an appeals court, "both the sentencing judge and the
Sentencing Commission will have reached the same conclusion as to the
proper sentence in the particular case." 95 This "double determination," as the
Court labels it, acts as a sort of reliable indicator that the within-Guidelines
sentences are, more likely than not, reasonable sentences.
96
To support the "double determination" rationale, the Court went into great
detail to explain Congress's directive to both the sentencing judge and the
Sentencing Commission to consider the § 3553(a) sentencing objectives.97
Overall, the Court stated that the statutes contemplate a sentencing world in
which district judges who sentence within the range set forth by the Sentencing
Guidelines undergo the same § 3553(a) analysis as was taken by the
Sentencing Commission in determining an appropriate sentencing range.
98
Therefore, the Rita decision operates under the assumptions that: (1)
Guidelines ranges result from the Commission following the § 3553(a)
objectives; and (2) sentencing judges independently consider the § 3553(a)
factors when they decide to sentence a defendant within the Guidelines range.
Whether or not these assumptions are based in sentencing reality, the Court
makes it clear that it finds the presumption of reasonableness for within-
Guidelines sentences valid because, after taking into account the purposes of
sentencing, a sentencing judge has exercised his discretion to impose a
sentence within the same range that the Commission has found acceptable.
99
Consequently, the within-Guidelines sentence has a "double determination" of
reasonableness, thus earning the rebuttable presumption.
D. Continued Confusion and the Need for Gall
After Rita, as was the case with Booker, there were still many unanswered
questions about reasonableness review and the proper role of the Sentencing
Guidelines within the reasonableness review framework. In Rita, the Supreme
Court did not elaborate on whether reasonableness review has both a
procedural and substantive component. Nor was it clear whether any
miscalculation of the applicable Guidelines range by a district court would
95. Id. at 2463.
96. Id.
97. Id. (explaining that the § 3553(a) sentencing objectives are considerations of: "(1)
offense and offender characteristics; (2) the need for a sentence to reflect the basic aims of
sentencing, namely (a) 'just punishment' (retribution), (b) deterrence, (c) incapacitation, (d)
rehabilitation; (3) the sentences legally available; (4) the Sentencing Guidelines; (5) Sentencing
Commission policy statements; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted disparities; and (7) the need for
restitution").
98. See id
99. Id. at 2465. As is discussed in Part 1II.F of this Article, there is reason to believe that, at
least in the context of cocaine sentencing, the Sentencing Commission does not properly follow
the § 3553(a) factors.
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ultimately render the sentence imposed ineligible for the presumption of
reasonableness, even if the sentence happened to fall within the range that
would have been determined absent the miscalculation. In Rita, the Supreme
Court stated: "Several Circuits have held that . . . they will presume that a
sentence imposed within a properly calculated United States Sentencing
Guidelines range is a reasonable sentence. The most important question before
us is whether the law permits the courts of appeals to use this presumption.
We hold that it does."' Thus, the Court merely required that a sentence fall
within a properly calculated Guidelines range for the presumption of
reasonableness to apply. The Court did not specify that it must be the district
court that properly calculates the Sentencing Guidelines range. In other words,
the Court seemingly left open the possibility that the Rita holding applies
anytime a sentence falls within the proper Guidelines range, whether or not it
is the district court that properly calculates the range. For example, if the
district court in Rita had miscalculated the Guidelines range to be twenty-five
to thirty-three months imprisonment but still sentenced Rita to thirty-three
months, the Supreme Court's words would leave room for the Fourth Circuit to
apply a presumption of reasonableness to the sentence because it did fall
within the proper thirty-three to forty-one month range despite the district
court's miscalculation.
However, at a later point in the Rita decision, the Court states its holding
slightly differently: "The first question is whether a court of appeals may apply
a presumption of reasonableness to a district court sentence that reflects a
proper application of the Sentencing Guidelines. We conclude that it can.' 
01
In this latter statement, the Court was more careful to apply its holding only to
those sentences that reflect a proper application of the Sentencing Guidelines.
Although properly calculating the Guidelines range would certainly indicate a
proper application of the Sentencing Guidelines, it was still not clear that the
Court believed proper calculation by the district court to be necessary for the
presumption of reasonableness to apply. In other words, the requirements for
procedural reasonableness remained unclear. Could a sentence be procedurally
reasonable if a district court made a Guidelines miscalculation based on a legal
error such as applying a sentencing enhancement improperly? Thinking about
the answer to the miscalculation question is important to the discussion of the
need to revise the role of the Sentencing Guidelines because the answer reveals
the extent of the Supreme Court's understanding of the psychology of
decision-making. This ultimately supports the argument that the Supreme
Court failed to consider that same psychological aspect when it maintained the
Guidelines' calculation requirement.
100. Id. at 2459 (citation omitted).
101. Id.at2462.
Catholic University Law Review
One possible source for an answer to the miscalculation question is in §
3742(f) of the Guidelines, which survived Booker's severability analysis and
reads, in part:
(f) DECISION AND DISPOSITION.-If the court of appeals
determines that the sentence-
(1) was imposed in violation of law or imposed as a
result of an incorrect application of the sentencing
guidelines, the court shall remand the case for further
sentencing proceedings with such instructions as the court
considers appropriate .... 102
Prior to the Booker decision, during the Guidelines' mandatory days, the
Supreme Court clarified that § 3742(f)(1) did not require remand for all
Guidelines calculation errors. In Williams v. United States, the Court
explained that a sentence is "imposed as a result of an incorrect [Guidelines]
application" in the following situations:
When a district court has not intended to depart from the
Guidelines, a sentence is imposed "as a result of' an incorrect
application of the Guidelines when the error results in the district
court selecting a sentence from the wrong guideline range. When a
district court has intended to depart from the guideline range, a
sentence is imposed "as a result of" a misapplication of the
Guidelines if the sentence would have been different but for the
district court's error.103
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that "once the court of appeals has decided
that the district court misapplied the Guidelines, a remand is appropriate unless
the reviewing court concludes, on the record as a whole, that the error was
harmless, i.e., that the error did not affect the district court's selection of the
sentence imposed."'104 In making the Guidelines advisory, Booker did not
invalidate § 3742(f), and circuits have taken different views of the role of §
3742(f)(1) in the post-Booker advisory Guidelines regime. In a majority of
circuits, miscalculations of the applicable Guidelines range render a sentence
unreasonable. 10 5 However, a minority view allows for miscalculations not
102. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(0 (Supp. V 2005) (emphases added).
103. Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 202-03 (1992).
104. Id. at 203.
105. See, e.g., United States v. Afridi, 241 F. App'x 81, 85 (4th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)
(citing United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 434 (4th Cir. 2006)) (stating that a sentence may
be unreasonable if the court rejects congressional or sentencing commission policies); United
States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054-55 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that remand is required if the
district court miscalculates the sentencing range); United States v. McBride, 434 F.3d 470, 475
n.3 (6th Cir. 2006) (addressing the possibility of vacating a sentence resulting from district court
failure to consider § 3553(a) factors).
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only to result in reasonable sentences, but also to earn a presumption of
reasonableness. 106
The minority circuit approach, employed by the Fifth Circuit, uses §
3742(f)(1) as a basis for applying a presumption of reasonableness for
sentences that fall within the proper Guidelines range even when the district
court has miscalculated the applicable range.10 7  The Fifth Circuit has
acknowledged that, prior to Booker, it would often remand cases for
resentencing when the sentencing judge miscalculated the Guidelines range.' 08
However, the Fifth Circuit has also explained that, because those sentences
were imposed when the Guidelines were still mandatory, it could determine
that the sentences were imposed "as a result of an incorrect application" of the
Sentencing Guidelines.' 0 9  Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit noted that, post-
Booker, "[f]ormalism does not require us to vacate [a defendant's] sentence so
that the district court, on remand, will simply impose the exact same sentence,
which on subsequent appeal we would be required to presume reasonable."' 10
When a sentencing court has made clear that it would impose the same
sentence regardless of whether a certain enhancement applies, then the
"formalism" rationale is defensible."' However, in practice, this minority
circuit approach applies the presumption of reasonableness even when there is
no discussion regarding whether the district judge would have applied the same
sentence regardless of the miscalculation, or whether the sentence was a result
of the incorrect application of the Guidelines. Instead, the minority view
grants the presumption of reasonableness solely on the basis of the sentence
falling within the correct Guidelines range, regardless of whether the district
court actually considered the proper Guidelines range before sentencing.
1 2
106. See, e.g., United States v. Medina-Argueta, 454 F.3d 479, 481 (5th Cir. 2006).
107. Id. at483.
108. Id. at 484.
109. United States v. Angeles-Mendoza, 407 F.3d 742, 754 (5th Cir. 2005).
110. Medina-Argueta, 454 F.3d at 484, n.2.
111. Though, as I have previously argued, even the district court's announcement that it
would impose the same sentence is untrustworthy because the court has been influenced by the
Guidelines range it calculated. See discussion supra Part II.B.
112. This minority view is at work in the following cases:
In United States v. Nikonova, 480 F.3d 371 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 163
(2007), one issue on appeal was whether the district court miscalculated the applicable Guidelines
range by improperly increasing Nikonova's sentence with a sadistic-image enhancement for the
content of some of the child pornography she possessed. Id. at 374. The Fifth Circuit found that
it did not need to resolve that issue because the thirty-one-month sentence still fell within the
twenty-seven to thirty-three month Guidelines range that would have been applicable without the
enhancement. Id. at 375. The Fifth Circuit in Nikonova makes no mention of whether the district
court would have imposed the same sentence regardless of whether the sadistic-image
enhancement applied. Id. at 374-75.
In United States v. Castillo-Rios, 212 F. App'x 355 (5th Cir. 2007), the district court
calculated the defendant's Guidelines range as seventy to eighty-seven months. Id. at 374. The
Fifth Circuit determined that without the enhancement to the defendant's criminal history points,
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Even in the months following Rita, there was no indication that the Fifth
Circuit would join the majority of circuits in refusing to apply a presumption of
reasonableness when the district court has miscalculated the proper Guidelines
range. In several cases, the Fifth Circuit applied the presumption of
reasonableness despite miscalculations without any discussion of whether the
sentencing court would have come to the same decision without the
miscalculation." 13 Therefore, at least from the Fifth Circuit's perspective, it
was not at all apparent that reasonableness review required a correct
Guidelines calculation. All that was required was that Guidelines were
calculated, whether correctly or incorrectly. And, if there was a
miscalculation, the sentence certainly would still be reasonable if it was a
sentence within the range "suggested" by the Sentencing Guidelines. This
view of reasonableness falls within the procedural-subjective reasonableness
review box because it gives significant deference to the district court following
the proper TProcedure of calculating the Guidelines and giving reasons for the
sentence." That the district court miscalculated the Guidelines is not reason
to render the sentence unreasonable in the subjective view of procedural
reasonableness. The Supreme Court could have adopted this same form of
procedural reasonableness review. However, though miscalculations were not
at issue in Gall, the Supreme Court used that case as an opportunity to explain
the components of reasonableness review and, consequently, to answer the
miscalculation question. 115  In doing so, the Court relied on reasoning that
which the defendant was contesting, the Guidelines range would have been fifty-seven to
seventy-one months. Id. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court's sentence of seventy
months was still within the Guidelines range, and was, therefore, entitled to a presumption of
reasonableness. Id. at 356.
In United States v. Britton, 225 F. App'x 219 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 149
(2007), the Fifth Circuit held that even if the district court miscalculated drug quantities, the
sentence was presumed reasonable because it fell within the Guidelines range that would apply
with the drug quantities claimed by the defendant. Id. at 222. The Fifth Circuit reached this
decision without concluding that the district court would have come to the same sentence despite
its miscalculation. Id.
113. See United States v. Guardiola, 247 F. App'x 552, 553 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
The defendant "contend[ed] that the district court erred by [enhancing] his offense level for
obstruction of justice." Id. Without determining whether there was a miscalculation, the Fifth
Circuit stated that the defendant's "420-month sentence [fell] within the 360-month-to-life range
that would have resulted had the district court not [enhanced] the offense level." Id Therefore,
the sentence was granted a presumption of reasonableness. Id. For a similar Fifth Circuit
determination, see also United States v. Nolasco-Gomez, 247 F. App'x 563 (5th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam). The Fifth Circuit found an error in the district court's calculation but decided that the
presumption applied because the sentence fell within the correct range. Id. at 564. Though the
court determined that the sentencing court said it would give the same sentence whether the
problematic enhancement applied or not, rather than discussing whether the district court
explicitly considered the § 3553(a) factors, the Fifth Circuit did not at all question whether the
miscalculation affected the reasonableness of the sentence. Id.
114. See Table supra p. 128.
115. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594-97 (2007).
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comports with psychology's understanding of reasonableness review,11 6 while
requiring the use of the Guidelines in such a way that is at odds with that
psychological understanding of decision-making.
E. Gall and the Real Meaning of Reasonableness Review
Two years after unleashing reasonableness review, the Supreme Court
seized the opportunity to clarify that standard of review in Gall v. United
States. 17 In Gall, the Court held that circuit courts must review all sentences,
despite their distance from the applicable Guidelines range, under a deferential
abuse of discretion type of standard." 8 The Court made it very clear that
reasonableness review was both a procedural and substantive review. The
Court described procedural reasonableness as follows:
[Circuit courts] must first ensure that the district court committed no
significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or
improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines
as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors ... or failing
to adequately explain the chosen sentence-including an explanation
for any deviation from the Guidelines range.119
It is only after procedural reasonableness has been determined that substantive
reasonableness is considered. 20  The Court described substantive
reasonableness review as a totality of the circumstances, abuse of discretion
standard. 21 Explaining further, the Court stated that a court of appeals should
give "due deference to the district court's decision that the § 3553(a) factors,
on a whole, justify [the sentence].' 22
In Gall, the Supreme Court placed reasonableness review in both the
procedural/objective box and the substantive/subjective box. As far as
procedural reasonableness is concerned, the Gall opinion endorses an objective
view in which miscalculations can render the sentence unreasonable. If the
procedural review were subjective (meaning considered from the district
court's point of view), then the district court's genuine act of calculating the
Guidelines and considering the § 3553(a) factors would be enough to render
the sentence procedurally reasonable. This subjective sort of procedural
reasonableness would allow for a sentence to be procedurally reasonable
despite Guidelines miscalculations. However, in Gall, the Supreme Court
quickly dismissed this possibility and, by doing so, made procedural
reasonableness an objective standard.
116. See id. at 596-98.
117. Id.
118. Id. at597.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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Substantive reasonableness, on the other hand, falls into the
substantive/subjective box. This is because the Court has now explained
substantive reasonableness review as being a deferential abuse of discretion
standard. This view of substantive reasonableness falls into the
substantive/subjective box because the Court favors giving deference to a
district court's sentence so long as the district court has given a "reasoned"
decision that the § 3553(a) factors justified the sentence.' 23  As indicated
previously, the Court could have gone in several directions in fleshing out the
reasonableness review standard.124  When given the opportunity to give
meaning to the reasonableness review standard, though, the Court decided to
mix an objective procedural standard with a subjective substantive standard, all
while keeping the Guidelines range as a factor to be calculated and considered
by district courts. 125 Therefore, while the psychology of sentencing requires
any meaningful procedural reasonableness review to be objective (because
miscalculations indicate reliance on a biased anchor), this result, combined
with the Court's choice to express the substantive component of
reasonableness review as a subjective factor, necessitates a move away from
the continued requirement that district courts calculate and consider the
Guidelines range.
F. Kimbrough, Substantive Reasonableness, and the Increasingly Problematic
Role of the Guidelines
While Gall was the case in which the Supreme Court first explained the
meaning of substantive reasonableness review, it was in Kimbrough v. United
States that the Court truly animated substantive reasonableness. In
Kimbrough, the Supreme Court held that the then-existing crack/powder
cocaine sentencing disparity in the Sentencing Guidelines was advisory
only. 27 Therefore, a sentencing judge may consider the disparity and find that,
because of it, a within-Guidelines sentence would be "'greater than necessary'
to serve the objectives of sentencing."' 28 In coming to this conclusion, the
Supreme Court went into a lengthy discussion of the then-existing 100-to-i
crack/powder cocaine sentencing disparity ratio, explaining that it was an
example of a situation in which "[t]he [Sentencing] Commission did not use
[an] empirical approach in developing the Guidelines sentences.,,129 The Court
further explained that it is now understood that crack and powder cocaine are
chemically similar and "have the same physiological and psychotropic
123. Id. at 602.
124. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
125. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597.
126. 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007).
127. Id. at 564.
128. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (Supp. V 2005)).
129. Id. at 567.
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effects."13  Additionally, the Court told of the Sentencing Commission's
discovery that the amount of the sentencing disparity was unwarranted and of
the Commission's repeated efforts to achieve a reduction in the crack/powder
cocaine ratio. 13 1 Therefore, the Court ultimately found that "while [§ 3553(a)]
still requires a court to give respectful consideration to the Guidelines, Booker
'permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as
well. ,,132
At first blush it appears as though Kimbrough merely explains the strength
of the deferential nature of the abuse of discretion standard set forth in Gall. In
Kimbrough, the Court explained the subjective nature of substantive
reasonableness by citing the propositions from Rita and Gall that it is the
sentencing judge who has "'greater familiarity with ... the individual case and
the individual defendant""..3 and is "therefore 'in a superior position to find
facts and judge their import under § 3553(a)' in each particular case."' 134
However, when viewed through the lens of the previous discussion on the
psychology of decision-making, it becomes apparent that Kimbrough signifies
much more. In Kimbrough, the Court still called for a "respectful
consideration" of the Guidelines, 35 which requires district courts to maintain
their task of properly calculating the applicable Guidelines range. The
problem with allowing improper Guidelines calculations to lead to sentences
that are presumed reasonable is that the district court has relied on a biased,
miscalculated anchor in making its sentencing determination. The effect of
Kimbrough is the acknowledgement that, at times, the Guidelines range, even
when properly calculated, can result in a biased and faulty anchor because the
range itself initially was improperly determined by the Sentencing
Commission.
At least part of the reason that the Supreme Court allowed a presumption of
reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences and continued to uphold the
requirement of calculating the Guidelines range was the presumption that there
is something meaningful in the Guidelines ranges themselves. In Rita, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that Congress has mandated that the Sentencing
Commission endeavor to:
provide certainty and fairness in sentencing, to avoi[d] unwarranted
sentencing disparities, to maintai[n] sufficient flexibility to permit
individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or
aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of
130. Id. at 566.
131. Id. at 568-69.
132. Id. at 570 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46
(2005)).
133. Id. at 574 (alteration in original) (quoting Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2469
(2007)).
134. Id. at 574 (quoting Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007)).
135. Id. at 570.
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general sentencing practices, and to reflect, to the extent practicable
[sentencing-relevant] advancement in [the] knowledge of human
behavior.1 6
And, though the Court also explains that the Commission has made "a serious,
sometimes controversial, effort to carry out this mandate,"'137 the decision in
Kimbrough shows that, at least with regard to the cocaine Guidelines, the
Commission failed in at least one of those duties-avoiding unwarranted
sentencing disparities. In Kimbrough, the Supreme Court goes to great lengths
to detail the reasons why the "Commission itself has reported that the
crack/powder disparity produces disproportionately harsh sanctions." 138 And
though, in this instance, the Guidelines admittedly did not reflect the
Commission's duty to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, the Supreme
Court in Kimbrough still returned to the position that the Guidelines should
serve as the "'starting point and initial benchmark"' for a district court's
sentencing decision.'
39
By adopting a form of reasonableness review that has an objective
procedural component as well as a subjective substantive component, while
still holding onto the Guidelines as a frame of reference for sentencing, the
Supreme Court is admitting that the properly calculated Guidelines range can
serve as a faulty, untrustworthy anchor; but the Court still requires that district
courts use that biased anchor as an initial benchmark for sentencing decisions.
This reasoning runs afoul of the justifications for requiring an objective
procedural reasonableness review in the first place. A sentence is procedurally
unreasonable if a sentencing court miscalculated the Guidelines range. This is
so because the court has used the wrong benchmark in making its sentencing
determination. A correct benchmark must be used because the benchmark
itself reflects a trustworthy and studied sentencing determination made by the
Sentencing Commission. Therefore, it must follow that when it has been
determined that the benchmarks sometimes do not reflect the Sentencing
Commission's studied and trustworthy sentencing determination, then the
justification for requiring reliance on that faulty benchmark fails.'40
136. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2463 (2007) (alterations in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 575.
139. Id. at 574 (quoting Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 596 (2007)).
140. It is true that the Supreme Court distinguishes the cocaine Guidelines from others
because the cocaine Guidelines were not initially determined using the same sort of empirical
evidence that was used for other Guidelines offenses. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct.
558, 567 (2007). Instead, in setting the cocaine Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission used a
weight-driven scheme. Id. However, this point is really of no consequence for several reasons.
The first is that the Court explained that this departure from the empirical evidence was used for
all drug offenses. Id. Therefore, at least with regard to drug offenses in particular, it is safe to
say that the unwarranted disparity issue may still be implicated. Second, the Court's decisions
have raised a question about the Guidelines' dependency. As a result, it is not entirely clear
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Unfortunately, the Supreme Court resisted taking these logical steps in
Kimbrough, and instead limited its observations to the cocaine Guidelines
only. Given the Court's history with the Guidelines however, this result,
though imprudent, is not surprising.
IV. THE DESIRE FOR FAMILIARITY AND THE NEED FOR CHANGE
Since Booker, the Supreme Court and lower courts have taken every
opportunity to hold onto the pre-Booker ways of mandatory Sentencing
Guidelines. 41  This strong addiction to the comfort of the sentencing
Guidelines can be seen in the non-effect that the Booker decision had on
federal sentencing. 42 Following Booker, circuit courts had the task of creating
the look and feel of reasonableness review for themselves.1 43 And it is no
surprise that it began to look and feel very much like the circuits' pre-Booker
practices. 44  It was easy for circuit court practices to remain relatively
unchanged because district court sentencing practices did not change much
after Booker either. 45  The Sentencing Commission has released data
indicating that there have been only small changes in sentencing patterns since
Booker was decided.' 46 In the year following Booker, the median sentences
imposed in most offense categories did not change significantly from their pre-
Booker lengths. 1
47
As Professor Douglas Berman has pointed out, "the modem history of
federal sentencing reforms provides interesting and diverse examples of status
quo biases at work." 48 Status quo biases are the "natural tendency of people
to generally prefer things to say relatively the same."' 149 And, as Professor
Berman describes, we have seen this status quo bias in the reluctant move to
whether there are ranges for other Guidelines offenses that are also faulty because of the method
used to determine those ranges. Even the possibility of a Guidelines range that is faulty (not
merely because it is not the best option in a particular defendant's instance, but because, as a
general matter, it does not reflect a studied and dependable sentencing assessment), is problematic
when calculation and consideration of the Guidelines ranges are required.
141. See Douglas A. Berman, Rita, Reasoned Sentencing, and Resistance to Change, 85
DENV. U. L. REV. 7, 21 (2007).
142. Id. at21-22.
143. See Mullen & Davis, supra note 6, at 631.
144. See id. at 625.
145. See James R. Dillon, Doubting Demaree: The Application of Ex Post Facto Principles to
the United States Sentencing Guidelines After United States v. Booker, 110 W. VA. L. REv. 1033,
1036, 1078 (2008).
146. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V.
BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 75-76 & tbl.5 (2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
booker reportfBooker Report.pdf [hereinafter U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, FINAL REPORT]. For the
Commission's other periodic data reports, see http://www.ussc.gov/bf.HTM.
147. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, FINAL REPORT, supra note 146, at75-76 & tbl.5.
148. Berman, supra note 141, at 19-20.
149. Id. at 19 (citing William F. Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in
Decision Making, I J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1988)).
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create and adopt the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the Supreme Court's
hesitance to completely do away with the Guidelines in Booker, and now, the
district and circuit courts' implementation of post-Booker procedures that
mirror the pre-Booker ways.1 50 Even after Gall and Kimbrough, the Supreme
Court continues to require the calculation of Guidelines ranges while
continually diminishing the importance of those ranges. In June of 2008, the
Supreme Court decided Irizarry v. United States, in which it held that district
courts do not have to give parties notice when contemplating a variance from
the recommended Guidelines range. 151 In coming to this decision, the Court
made it clear that the Guidelines should remain a starting benchmark in
sentencing decisions.1 52 However, the Court also reasoned that, now that the
Guidelines are advisory, "neither the Government nor the defendant may place
the same degree of reliance on the type of 'expectancy"' that was the basis for
the notice requirement under the mandatory Guidelines regime. 153 Just as the
Supreme Court did through the combination of Gall and Kimbrough, in
Irizarry the Court placed the Sentencing Guidelines on a pedestal of
importance while handing district courts a stick to use in smashing them to
near irrelevance. As Gall, Kimbrough, and Irizarry show, the familiar
dependence on the seeming reliability of the Guidelines, coupled with the
requirements of an advisory Guidelines regime, means that it must be time to
consider a new role for the Sentencing Guidelines.
A. What's Behind the Numbers?: The Calculation Process
To best appreciate the need for a new role for th6 Guidelines, it is useful to
understand the current usage of the Guidelines. In order to calculate the
applicable Guidelines range, several factors about the behavior of the
defendant and the characteristics of the offense are given a prescribed numeric
value. 154 Pretrial Services conducts an investigation of the defendant and the
offense and presents the sentencing court with a Pretrial Services Investigation
Report ("PSR" or "PSI") outlining all of these factors and adding their numeric
values, the total of which is termed the "base offense level.' 5 5 Once the base
offense level is determined, a court can increase or decrease this number by a
certain amount for various sentencing-enhancing and sentencing-decreasing
factors. 156 The amount by which a base offense level can be increased or
150. Id. at 19-22.
151. Irizarry v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2198, 2203-04 (2008).
152. Id. at 2202-03 (citing United States v. Gall, 128 S. Ct. 586, 596-97 (2007)).
153. Id. at 2202.
154. For example, first-degree murder earns a defendant a base offense level of forty three,
while involuntary manslaughter involving criminally negligent conduct is assigned a base offense
level of twelve. U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 12, §§ 2Al.l(a),
2Al.4(a)(1).
155. Id §§ IBl.l(b),6A1.l(a).
156. Id. § IBI.4.
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decreased is determined by provisions in the Sentencing Guidelines.' 57 The
adjustments result in the "total offense level."'' 58 The PSR also indicates the
offender's criminal history, which is given a numeric value called the
"criminal history category."' 59 The Sentencing Guidelines Manual provides a
grid on which the criminal history score falls on one axis and the total offense
level falls on the other.16  The point on the grid where the applicable criminal
history row meets the applicable offense level column provides the sentencing
range suggested by the Sentencing Commission for that criminal history and
offense level combination.' 
61
The Guidelines calculation process asks sentencing judges to take the
resulting range as reliable conclusions made by the Sentencing Commission
without giving much information about the source of the numbers that
determine the ranges, or why those ranges correspond to particular offender-
offense combinations. In Kimbrough, the Supreme Court left room for district
courts to disagree with Guidelines ranges that are systematically inconsistent
with the § 3553(a) purposes of sentencing.' 62 However, all a sentencing judge
is equipped to do is depart from the applicable Guidelines range when it does
not meet the sentencing requirements for the particular defendant before that
judge.' 63 There is no formal method by which judges, through the traditional
calculation of the sentencing Guidelines, can asses how particular Guidelines
ranges were developed and whether those methods are systematically
dependable. In the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the Sentencing
Commission explains that it determined the Guidelines ranges "by estimating
the average sentences now being served within each category" and by
"examin[ing] the sentence specified in congressional statutes, in the parole
157. For example, acceptance of responsibility is one factor that can decrease a defendant's
offense level by two levels pursuant to § 3El.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. § 3El.l(a).
A defendant's offense level can be increased by two to four levels if that district court determines
that the defendant played an aggravating role in the offense, pursuant to § 3B1.1 of the
Sentencing Guidelines. Id. § 3B1.I. These are just some of the factors that can enhance or
decrease a defendant's offense level.
158. See id. at ch. 5, pt. A, cmt.
159. The criminal history category is determined by adding the values of various factors,
such as three points for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month,
two points for each prior sentence of at least sixty days, and two points if the defendant
committed the instant offense while under any criminal justice sentence. Id. §§ 4A 1.1 (a)-(c).
160. Id. at ch. 5, pt. A, tbl.
161. For instance, an offense level of thirteen and a criminal history score of two results in a
Guidelines sentencing range of fifteen to twenty-one months of imprisonment. Id.
162. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 575-76 (2007). In addition, during the
Gall oral argument, Justice Breyer urged a definition of reasonableness that allows for judges to
depart from the Guidelines "when they have something unusual and maybe occasionally when
they think the guideline wasn't considered properly, and then the iterative process takes over,
going back to the commission." Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, Gall v. United States, 128
S.Ct. 586 (2007) (No. 06-7949).
163. U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 12, § 5K2.0(a)(l).
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guidelines, and in other relevant, analogous sources." 164 Although this method
is said to apply to all of the Guidelines ranges, it does not explain the
background of sentencing ranges in any particular offense. If judges are
allowed to depart from sentencing ranges that systematically fail to carry out
the § 3553(a) mandates, instead of merely being undesirable in an individual
case, they must be given the tools to understand when such a problem exists.
The crack/powder cocaine distinction was noticeable to district courts because
it was a severe disparity against which several public defenders and civil rights
advocates, among others, had been arguing for years.' 65 However, it may be
that there are other Guidelines provisions that are unfair and troubling, but to a
less obvious degree. 166 Kimbrough leaves room for district courts to consider
the implications of those Guidelines as well, and to adjust defendants'
sentences accordingly. 167 However, there is no reliable means for a district
court to know whether the Guidelines ranges for specific offenses have such
defects.
164. Id § 1Al.1(4)(g).
165. See, e.g., David A. Harris, The Reality of Racial Disparity in Criminal Justice: The
Significance of Data Collection, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 72 (2003) (identifying the
crack/powder cocaine sentencing disparity); see also Steven L. Chanenson & Douglas A.
Berman, Federal Cocaine Sentencing In Transition, 19 FED. SENT'G REP. 291, 291-93 (2007)
(explaining the history of the crack sentencing controversy).
166. Since the Supreme Court in Kimbrough opened the door for attacks on various
Guidelines ranges for lacking empirical bases, the National Federal Defender Sentencing
Resource Counsel has begun a special project, Deconstructing the Guidelines, designed to give
defense attorneys a tool to argue that certain Guidelines themselves fail "properly to reflect §
3553(a) considerations, reflect[] an unsound judgment, [do] not treat defendant characteristics in
the proper way, or that a different sentence is appropriate regardless." See Deconstructing the
Guidelines, http://www.fd.org/odstbSentencingResource3.htm#DECONS; see also OFF.
DEFENDER SERVS., FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE SENTENCING RESOURCE MANUAL:
USING STUDIES & STATISTICS TO REDEFINE THE PURPOSES OF SENTENCING 1 (2008), available
at http://www.fd.org/odstbSentencingResource3.htm#DECONS (compiling "useful resources
that federal defense attorneys can consult when drafting sentencing memoranda and making oral
arguments for sentences below the advisory guideline range").
167. In Kimbrough, the Supreme Court declined to answer the question of whether a
sentencing judge may vary from the Guidelines based "solely on the judge's view that the
Guidelines range 'fails to properly reflect §3553(a) considerations."' Kimbrough v. United
States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 575 (2007) (quoting Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2465 (2007)).
However, I am concerned not with the situations where the judge disagrees with the Guidelines
policy solely based on his own view, but when, as in Kimbrough, the judge's disagreement is
based on statistics and studies (and perhaps the future acknowledgement by the Commission)
revealing the error in the Guidelines treatment of an offense. This is the position taken by federal
District Judge Nancy Gertner in United States v. Haynes, a case in which she sentences a
defendant to the below-Guidelines sentence of time served, finding that the harms of
incarceration would be against sound sentencing policy in that defendant's case. United States v.
Haynes, 557 F. Supp. 2d 200, 207 (D. Mass. 2008).
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B. When the Numbers are Wrong: The Trouble With Using the Guidelines in
Their Traditional Form
If the only justification for the continued requirement that the Guidelines
range be calculated and considered is that the Court, because of its status quo
bias, is hesitant to let go of a familiar sentencing instrument, then it hardly
seems a reasonable aspect of reasonableness review. Of course, the Court has
said all along that the Guidelines serve the purpose of facilitating sentencing
uniformity among districts and circuits.' 68 However, in Kimbrough, the Court
recognized that "some departures from uniformity [are] a necessary cost of the
remedy" adopted in Booker.169 To hold onto the potentially faulty Guidelines
as a benchmark for the sake of uniformity is just as procedurally unsound as
allowing miscalculations to be the basis of a reasonable sentence. The
Supreme Court already dismissed miscalculations as unreasonable, and, while
it may not be that all of the Sentencing Guidelines ranges are faulty,
Kimbrough leaves open the possibility that the Sentencing Commission, at
least sometimes, gets it wrong. 17 Booker allows judges to sentence outside the
Guidelines range when the judge determines that the Sentencing Commission
got the range wrong regarding that particular defendant before the court.
1 71
However, Kimbrough's admission that sometimes the Guidelines range can be
unreliable for an entire group of offenders presents a situation in which the
necessary sacrifice of uniformity by repositioning the Guidelines should be
acceptable.
One could argue that, even if there are faulty Guidelines ranges for the crack
cocaine offenses, it does not mean that the Guidelines are biased anchors as a
whole. Although such an argument is merited, the problem remains that it is
not made apparently clear to a sentencing judge which set of offense ranges
carries a high versus a low indicia of reliability as determined by the method
used by the Commission in reaching those sentencing results. In Kimbrough,
the Supreme Court admitted that the sentencing ranges for all drug offenses
were developed by using a weight-based standard rather than an empirical
standard based on sentences being imposed at that time. 72 The Court blamed
this weight-based standard for the crack/powder cocaine sentence disparity in
the Guidelines as they were at the time of the Kimbrough decision."' So, the
same disconnect between the pre-reform crack sentences and the purposes of
sentencing potentially exists for all drug offenses as applied to all drug
offenders. Further, though the Court focused on the weight-based standard as
168. See Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 573.
169. Id. at 574.
170. See id. at 575.
171. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259-60 (2005).
172. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 566-67.
173. Id. at 567-68.
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a basis for the unwarranted crack/powder cocaine disparity,' 74 the Court
opened the possibility that even empirically based ranges can be dismissed in
the way the crack cocaine Guidelines can if it can be argued convincingly that
those ranges were developed in a manner that is inconsistent with the § 3553(a)
sentencing purposes.' 75 Therefore, blind reliance on the properly calculated
Guidelines ranges as trustworthy anchors should be rethought.
V. A MORE REASONABLE WAY: REPURPOSING THE GUIDELINES FROM
BENCHMARK ANCHOR TO RELIABLE RESOURCE
The psychology of decision-making reveals that once a judge calculates the
Guidelines range, she will be influenced by that range, even if she ultimately
decides to impose a sentence that falls outside of it. However, if the Supreme
Court would do away with the requirement that sentencing courts calculate the
Guidelines as a first step, then there will be less risk that sentences will be
influenced by faulty anchors that do not reflect the § 3553(a) goals of
sentencing. Of course, some may argue that this will result in the type of pre-
Guidelines lack of sentencing uniformity that the Guidelines were developed to
combat. To avoid losing uniformity completely, the sentencing purposes
found in the § 3553(a) factors can serve as the initial benchmark that all district
courts use as a frame of reference in their sentencing decisions. The relevant
factors would include: (1) any pertinent policy statement issued by the
Sentencing Commission; (2) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing
disparities; (3) the need to provide restitution to victims; and (4) the
requirement to impose sentences that reflect the seriousness of the offense,
promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate
174. Seeidat571.
175. There is a large body of work criticizing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as too harsh
and reflecting an overreliance on incarceration, or as creating, rather than alleviating, sentencing
disparity, or both. See, e.g., Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S.,
Speech at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003), at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-09-03.html (observing that because
federal sentences are often too long, "[t]he Federal Sentencing Guidelines should be revised
downward," and that "[i]n too many cases, mandatory minimum sentences are unwise and
unjust"); KATE STITH & JOSt A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS 59-65 (1998) (discussing the Guidelines' role in increasing average
sentences); MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 78-79 (1996) (explaining the shortcomings
of the Guidelines); Harris, supra note 165, at 71-72 (discussing disparities in sentencing); James
P. Lynch, A Comparison of Prison Use in England, Canada, West Germany, and the United
States: A Limited Test of the Punitive Hypothesis, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 180, 198
(1988) (explaining disparities in imprisonment rates among different countries); Eugene D.
Natali, The Probation Officer, Bean Counting and Truth in Sentencing, 4 FED. SENT'G REP. 102,
102 (1991) (suggesting methods for amending the Guidelines to increase predictability and
reduce disparity); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1938, 1948 (1988) (criticizing the Sentencing
Commission for the lack of persons experienced in federal sentencing among its members);
Aaron Rappaport, The State of Severity, 12 FED. SENT'G REP. 3, 3 (1999) (examining the role of
sentencing purposes).
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deterrence, protect the public, and effectively provide the defendant with
needed educational or vocational training and medical care. 76 Rather than
being used as a numeric benchmark, these sentencing factors will act as
guiding purposes for all sentencing decisions. Therefore, procedural
reasonableness will not hinge on a district court properly calculating the
Guidelines range, but rather on that court considering the relevant § 3553(a)
factors and explaining how the sentence imposed relates to those factors. One
may then ask what purpose the Sentencing Guidelines will serve at all. This
approach does not require throwing the Sentencing Guidelines away
completely, but suggests that the Guidelines be given a new place in
sentencing determinations.
The new advisory status of the Guidelines calls for a change in the format
and usage of the Guidelines. As it stands, the Sentencing Guidelines continue
to be presented in the same format that they had in their mandatory days. In
Rita, the Supreme Court acknowledged that "[t]he Commission's work is
ongoing. The statutes and the Guidelines themselves foresee continuous
evolution helped by the sentencing courts and courts of appeals in that
process."'' 7 7  Thus, when judges impose sentences, the Court envisions a
process in which "[t]he Commission will collect and examine the results. In
doing so, it may obtain advice from prosecutors, defenders, law enforcement
groups, civil liberties associations, experts in penology, and others. And it can
revise the Guidelines accordingly.' Because the Court has recognized that
the Guidelines should evolve, Kimbrough signals a time at which such
evolution is quite ap ropriate. We have already seen a bit of this in the new
cocaine Guidelines. However, even those revised Guidelines are simply
new numbers set within the existing Guidelines grid format.'80 Now that the
Guidelines are only supposed to carry advisory weight, there is no necessary
reason for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to continue to retain the format
that it had while in its mandatory glory. Instead, the Guidelines should be
176. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
177. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2464 (2007).
178. Id.
179. On November 1, 2006, the U.S. Sentencing Commission's crack cocaine sentencing
amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines went into effect. The amendment will affect seventy
percent of federal crack cocaine cases, and reduce those sentences by an average of fifteen
months, though the crack penalties are still stiffer than powder cocaine penalties. The
amendment was made retroactive on December 11, 2007. Press Release, U.S. Sent'g Comm'n,
U.S. Sentencing Commission Votes Unanimously to Apply Amendment Retroactively for Crack
Cocaine Offenses (Dec. 11, 2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/PRESS/rel121107.htm;
FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT CRACK
AMENDMENT RETROACTIVITY (2008), available at http://www.famm.org/Repository/Files/web_
crack FAQs 1_29 08.finalversion%5B1%5D.pdf.
180. Compare U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 12, § 2D1.l(c)
(2007's drug quantity table), with U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Dl.l(c)
(1995) (1995's drug quantity table).
Catholic University Law Review
revamped to take on a more advisory appearance that will have the effect of
being an advisory resource, rather than influential anchors.
The Sentencing Commission has been given the duty to collect and examine
sentencing results.' 81 This can be done in many ways, which means that there
are multiple forms that advisory Sentencing Guidelines can take. One
possibility is to reinvent the Guidelines so that they are focused not on
calculations, but on reporting the percentages of frequency at which various
lengths of sentences are being imposed in federal courts across the country for
specific crimes. There are several sources that advocate the use of statistics in
sentencing decisions, especially as such data has increasingly been used with
success in other disciplines.' 82 Currently the Sentencing Commission collects
data on federal sentencing practices across districts, but this data is tied to the
Sentencing Guidelines and gives information such as the number of sentences
falling outside or within the Guidelines range in various districts. 183 A new use
of the Guidelines would be to present statistics on how often judges are
imposing particular sentences for particular crimes. Therefore, there would be
no requirement that district courts calculate offender and offense
characteristics to determine a specific range of sentences. Rather, the
sentencing judge, after considering the § 3553(a) factors and selecting a
sentence, can look to the Guidelines' national sentencing statistics as a check
on the judge's own conformance to national sentencing trends without the
initial anchoring bias that a calculation would cause.'
84
In addition to collecting sentencing statistics, the Sentencing Commission
can carry out its mandate to "examine" these statistics by providing
information on how the sentences being imposed in the various districts relate
181. 28 U.S.C. § 995 (2000).
182. See Paul J. Hofer & William P. Adams, Using Data For Policymaking, Litigation, and
Judging, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 8, 8 (2003) ("The progress made in fields like medicine by using
data wisely reinforces the belief that public policy and legal decision making would also benefit
from empirical research."); see also Ruback & Wroblewski, supra note 38, at 757 (explaining that
there are limits to human decision-making ability despite individuals' belief that they can make
correct decisions, and therefore, statistics provide a superior method of decision-making).
183. For further explanation of the Sentencing Commission's current data-collection
function, see Robert W. Sweet, D. Evan van Hook & Edward V. Di Lello, Towards a Common
Law of Sentencing: Developing Judicial Precedent in Cyberspace, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 927,
945-47 (1996) (explaining that the Commission act as a clearinghouse for data and uses that data
"to present a historical picture to Congress and to the Commission to aid these bodies in making
law and policy."). See also the Sentencing Commission's quarterly updates, which are available
at http://www.ussc.gov/bf.htm.
184. This is similar to the Sentencing Information System (SIS) currently used by the High
Court of Scotland as an alternative to sentencing guidelines. The SIS provides sentencing
patterns for cases that match the factors input to the system by the user. For a description of this
system, see Hofer & Adams, supra note 182, at 12. See also Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as
Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 369 (2003) (mentioning the use of statistics in
Scotland's sentencing system). Another possibility is to use the new statistical Guidelines as an
appellate tool only by which reviewing courts will decide whether the sentence is too out of line
with those being imposed across the district as to warrant further explanation or reversal.
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to the success of carrying out the relevant § 3553(a) factors. One criticism of
the use of statistics is that statistics carry with them the need for
interpretation. 85 With its resources, the Sentencing Commission is in a great
position to not only collect sentencing data, but to explain whether the
sentences being imposed are having the desired effects on crime in those
districts. This would give sentencing courts much more reliable information in
making decisions about whether to impose a sentence that is consistent with
the majority of sentences being imposed for that offense, or whether the
particular case before them warrants a different sentence. 186 In such a system,
the Sentencing Guidelines will be truly advisory as they become one of many
resources that can guide a district court to a reasonable sentence.
187
With this new approach, the Guidelines would become more of a sentencing
resource, rather than a starting anchor that would influence a judge's initial
thoughts about a reasonable sentence. On review, then, the circuit courts
would still apply an objective procedural review to determine whether the
district court considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors and gave reasons for the
sentence. The only difference would be the lack of any requirement that the
Guidelines range be calculated. Then the circuit courts would apply the same
deferential abuse-of-discretion form of substantive reasonableness by
determining whether the reasons given by the district court for the sentence
imposed comport with the § 3553(a) factors considered. 188 Therefore, as Gall
sets forth, the objective procedural review and subjective substantive review
would remain as the meat of reasonableness review. 189 Furthermore, the goal
of uniformity balanced with judicial discretion, though taking another form,
185. Hofer & Adams, supra note 182, at 8.
186. This seems similar to the use of sentencing data that Judge Michael Marcus of the
Circuit Court of Multnomah County, Oregon suggests for revisions to the Model Penal Code's
sentencing provisions when he advocates for
the need for empirical validation for sentencing assumptions [that] arises from the
reality that with rare exception, judges, however well intended, have no sufficient
direction, training, data or information about what works on which offenders, and are
encouraged by sentencing culture to rely on wildly diverse and often incorrect
ideology, whim, sentencing folklore, and repeated guesswork to determine sentences.
Michael Marcus, Limiting Retributivism: Revisions to Model Penal Code Sentencing Provisions,
29 WHITTIER L. REv. 295, 303 (2007) (footnote omitted).
187. There are and have been several resources that can aid a judge in making a sentencing
determination. Paul Hofer and William Adams point to a few of those resources, including the
Bureau of Justice Statistics' SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS (annual statistical
report that is available in print and online at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/sourcebook.htm). See
Hofer & Adams, supra note 182, at 9.
188. There is still considerable confusion among the circuits about what this abuse of
discretion standard really means for the proper role of appellate courts. Though further
discussion is best had in a subsequent article, I agree with the position taken by the First Circuit
that substantive reasonableness review is satisfied when the district court has given "a plausible
sentencing rationale and a defensible result." United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 96 (lst Cir.
2008) (citing United States v. Jim~nez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 519 (1st Cir. 2006)).
189. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007).
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would not be lost. If the Supreme Court would take the steps to do away with
the Guidelines calculation requirement, then perhaps Congress could be
prompted to revise the Guidelines so that they are still relevant to sentencing
decisions.
VI. CONCLUSION
By mandating the creation of the Sentencing Guidelines, Congress sought to
achieve honesty, uniformity, and proportionality in sentencing. 90  While
uniformity can certainly be achieved through the current form of the
Guidelines, it does not necessarily mean that what results is the sort of
uniformity that is desired. In achieving uniformity, Congress specifically
sought to "narrow[] the wide disparity in sentences imposed by different
federal courts for similar criminal conduct by similar offenders."' 91  In
Kimbrough, the Supreme Court, following the Sentencing Commission's lead,
admitted that achieving uniformity in order to reduce disparity in sentencing
was not achieved in the cocaine sentencing ranges.' 92 Rather, the Guidelines
resulted in larger than warranted disparities among crack and powder cocaine
offenders that were truly more similarly situated than the sentencing policies
reflected. 193 This result also undermined Congress's goal of proportionality,
because it was admitted by the Sentencing Commission that crack sentences
were lengthier than necessary. 194 As claimed, this admission lends credence to
arguments that other ranges provided by the Sentencing Guidelines might well
be suspect, though there is no reliable method to alert district courts to
situations in which the Guidelines ranges themselves are founded on faulty
principles. Such a situation also undermines Congress's goal of keeping
sentencing honest because district courts will rely on faulty ranges, and circuit
courts will stamp the resulting sentences with presumptions of reasonableness
if they fall within the Guidelines range that is not itself honestly reasonable.
Once this possible faultiness of the Sentencing Guidelines is acknowledged,
those who stand by the constitutionality of the Booker remedy and those who
argue that the remedial opinion failed to address the Guidelines' constitutional
dilemma alike can agree that there is value in rethinking the Guidelines'
current role.
As psychology teaches, the same reasoning that supports not allowing
Guidelines miscalculations to lead to procedurally reasonable sentences should
apply to properly calculated Guidelines ranges that are based on faulty
sentencing policy. Because of the anchoring effect, calculating Guidelines
ranges will always influence the ultimate sentence in some manner. One way
190. U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 12, § IAl. 1 ed. n.
191. Id.
192. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 568 (2007).
193. See id.
194. Id.
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to remove that bias is to do away with the requirement that district courts
calculate the Guidelines range before sentencing a defendant.1 95 Of course,
there are difficulties in implementing the statistical formulation of the
Guidelines proposed in this Article. For one, it is unclear how the transition to
the statistical model will take place. For a time, the statistics collected by the
Sentencing Commission will reflect sentences imposed by courts that have
calculated the applicable Guidelines range and considered that range before
sentencing, as Booker requires. Therefore, if the argument is that the
sentencing ranges presented in the Guidelines may be biased, then the statistics
on sentencing trends will reflect reliance on faulty Guidelines ranges. Further,
many (if not most) district court judges feel uneasy about determining
sentences without referring to Guidelines ranges because the Guidelines have
been around in some form for the entirety of their judicial careers.' 96
Additionally, there are obstacles implicit in the use of statistics, such as
people's general resistance to using them.197  However, despite these
difficulties, the point remains the same. A new, truly advisory Guidelines role
would be truer to Booker's view of the Sentencing Commission's duty to
research the sentencing landscape and "revis[e] the Guidelines accordingly." 98
Now that the Supreme Court has defined reasonableness review to have a
procedural component while also allowing a sentence to be substantively
reasonable even if the district court imposes a sentence that reflects that
judge's reasonable disagreement with a Guidelines' policy, the time for
revising the role of Guidelines is certainly here. As everything about federal
sentencing jurisprudence changes, it becomes increasingly unreasonable for the
Sentencing Guidelines to stay the same.
195. For all of the reasons discussed in this Article, I believe that the best course of action
would be for district courts not to be required to calculate the Guidelines range at all. However, I
recognize that in order to get rid of the requirement that district courts calculate the Guidelines
range all together, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) would have to be amended to delete § 3553(a)(4), which
requires that the sentencing court consider the Guidelines range. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)
(Supp. V 2005). This can be done through legislative action. However, the Supreme Court could
take the first step by at least doing away with the requirement to begin the sentencing
determination with the Guidelines calculation.
196. See Gertner, supra note 14, at 525, 537 (explaining that, post-Booker, judges have
shown little fondness for departing from the Guidelines partially because of feelings of
institutional incapacity).
197. This tendency is known as "availability bias." For an explanation, see Ruback &
Wroblewski, supra note 38, at 755.
198. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005). See also Transcript of Oral
Argument at 35, Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007) (No. 06-7949), in which Justice
Scalia argues that using the Guidelines as a criterion of sentencing is not using them in an
advisory manner.
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